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NUMBER 3

ASPECTS OF THE TURNOVER PROCEEDING IN
BANKRUPTCY
JOSEPH W. McGOVERNt

THE trustee in bankruptcy is vested, upon his qualification, with title
to all the non-exempt property which belonged to the bankrupt
on the date the petition was filed. But whereas this title placidly comes
to rest -with him by operation of law, strenuous effort on the part of

the trustee may be required to gather together all the assets of the estate,
wherever they may be found. His search for missing property may lead

him to the bankrupt or to third parties, often the bankrupt's friends or
relatives or officers of a bankrupt corporation, who are found to be
concealing or withholding money or goods which are part of the estate
in bankruptcy. In such circumstances the trustee,2 as the chosen repre-

sentative of the creditors, 3 has the right and duty to vindicate his
title and right of possession. To that end, he may effectively institute
a summary proceeding to compel those who have the property to surrender it to him. This form of remedy is commonly known as the
"turnover proceeding."

The turnover proceeding is begun by petition and order to show cause,

is heard and determined by the referee in bankruptcy,4 and, if successful,

culminates in an order directing the respondentO to surrender or turn
' Lecturer in Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 11 U. S. C. A. 110.
2. A receiver, though he has no title, may sometimes commence proceedings to compel
the surrender of assets of the estate in bankruptcy. Kattelman v. Madden, 83 F. (2d)
88 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); In re J. H. Jackson Co., 15 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926);
In re Harry L. Sugarman, Inc., 3 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). Usually, however, the
turnover petition is filed by the trustee. The trustee may be substituted for the recelver
in a pending proceeding. Cf. In re Goldberg, 91 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
3. Bankruptcy Act § 44; 11 U. S. C. A. 72.
4. After adjudication and reference the designated referee had jurisdiction of all the
proceedings except those required by the Bankruptcy Act or General Orders to be had
before the Judge. GENERAL OFnans iN BAANu:r= No. 12, Su. 1. In re Goldberg,
91 F. (2d) 996, 997 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Bankruptcy Act § 1(9), 11 U. S. C. A. 1(9)
provides: "'Court' shall mean the judge or the referee of the court of bankruptcy in vhich
the proceedings are pending."
5. The person against whom the trustee seeks the turnover order is called the re-pandent
and the trustee, the petitioner.
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over to the trustee certain property constituting part of the assets of
the estate in bankruptcy, said property having been found to be in
respondent's possession or under his control.
It is important to note that this form of relief is granted in what is
known as a summary proceeding.6 Summary jurisdiction exists only
when the court has in its possession the property which is the subject
of controversy.7 Upon the filing of the petition in bankruptcy all the
bankrupt's property passes into the custody of the court of bankruptcy, 8
and when actual possession of the property is taken by the court, through
its officers, the court of bankruptcy thereby acquires summary jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions respecting the title, possesSuch power to pass judgment on
sion or control of the property.
property in its possession is not peculiar to a court of bankruptcy but
is inherent in any competent court and independent of authorization by
statute.-o
For the exercise of the court's summary jurisdiction, however, it is
not necessary that the court, through its officers, have actual possession
of the property in dispute. Constructive possession will suffice, and will
be found to exist when assets of the estate in bankruptcy claimed by
the trustee are in the actual possession or control of some third party
who either makes no claim of right to the property or whose claim of
right is merely colorable. 1 Since in the turnover proceeding the trustee
6. The nature of the summary proceeding is discussed in 5 RsammOxON, BA KXUPTCy
(4th ed. 1936) § 2400.
7. Not every dispute involving the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy may be adjudicated in a summary proceeding. When the court lacks the requisite possession of the property in controversy, the trustee must resort to the ordinary plenary suit, unless there is a
specific statutory grant of summary jurisdiction. Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264 U. S.
426, 430, 431 (1924).
8. Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610, 615 (1934); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1,
14 (1902).
9. Murphy v. Hofman Co., 211 U. S. 562 (1909).
10. Murphy v. Hofman Co., 211 U. S. 962 (1909); Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610,
615 (1934).
11. "Constructive possession is sufficient. It exists where the property was in the
physical possession of the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
but was not delivered by him to the trustee; where the property was delivered to the
trustee, but was thereafter wrongfully withdrawn from his custody; where the property
is in the hands of the bankrupt's agent or bailee; where the property is held by some other
person who makes no claim to it; and where the property is held by one who makes a
claim, but the claim is colorable only. As every court must have power to determine, In
the first instance, whether it has jurisdiction to proceed, the bankruptcy court has, in every
case, jurisdiction to determine whether it has possession actual or constructive. It may
conclude, where it lacks actual possession, that the physical possession held by some other
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is seeking the surrender of property alleged to be in the actual physical
possession of a third party, it is apparent that it is constructive possession
of the bankrupt's property which there forms the foundation for the
exercise of the court's summary jurisdiction. Thus before the trustee
may successfully prosecute a turnover proceeding he must be able to
show as a jurisdictional requirement that the respondent has no more
than a colorable claim to the property.' 2 If a substantial question of law
or of fact is presented by respondent's adverse claim to the property in
dispute, he may at the outset challenge the summary jurisdiction of the
court and the trustee will be relegated to his plenary suit.!3 If the respondent does not by the assertion of a substantial adverse claim take
exception to the court's summary jurisdiction that objection is waived 1 4
When the issue is raised by timely objection, the court is called upon to
decide at the threshold of the proceeding whether the adverse claim asserted by the respondent has substance or is merely colorable. 1 Such
an inquiry may require extended hearings and the heart of the controversy may often be laid bare by an investigation which in its nature
is only preliminary for the purpose of determining whether the trustee
has brought the controversy to the proper forum.'0
The Issues
For the purposes of this article, we will assume that no preliminary
challenge of the court's jurisdiction has been successfully made by the
respondent's assertion of a substantial adverse claim to the property.
Even with that assumption, however, the trustee will not become entitled
to a summary order for the surrender of the property unless an affirmative answer is found to each of the following questions:' 7
persons is of such a nature that the property is constructively within the po6seion of
the court." Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 432 (1924).
12. Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U. S. 191, 194 (1926).
13. Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U. S. 191, 193 (1926).
For the distinction between
summary proceeding and plenary suit see Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell,
58 F. (2d) 721, 731, 732 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
14. In re Pinsky-Lapin & Co., Inc., 98 F. (2d) 776, 777 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Page v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 286 U. S. 269 (1932); In re Hopkins, 229 Fed. 378, 3S0 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1916). No formal consent or submission to the jurisdiction is required.
15. "In every case the bankruptcy court has power, in the first instance, to determine
whether it hag that actual or constructive possession which is essential to its jurizdiction
to proceed." Harris v. Brundage Co., 305 U. S. 160, 163 (1938); cf. Muller v. Nugent,
184 U. S. 1 (1902).
16. Note, Scope of the Sumnary Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court (1940) 40 COL.
L. R v. 489.
17. In re Gordon & Gelberg, 69 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934)--'The appellee (trustee)
had the burden of establishing by dear proof (a) title to the property in the trustee as
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1. Has the trustee title to the property in question as part of the
assets of the estate in bankruptcy?
2. Did respondent acquire possession of or control over the property
8
sought by the trustee?1
3. Does respondent still have possession of or control over the property at the time the turnover order is to be made?"9
The required affirmative answer to these questions must be supported
by "clear and convincing evidence." 2 A mere preponderance of evidence is not enough.2 ' Highly persuasive proof by the trustee is demanded
for the respondent's protection, since the remedy for non-compliance with
the turnover order is the contempt proceeding,22 wherein it is too late collaterally to attack the turnover order. If it was a mistake to issue
the turnover order, the respondent is in danger of being imprisoned
for his failure to do the impossible.2" The only way the respondent
may avoid the penalty of his failure to comply with the court's order
is by establishing that events subsequent to the issuance of the order
part of the bankrupt estate and (b) that the appellants at the date of the bankruptcy
and when the order was made were in possession and control of the books which had
been kept and concealed from the trustee." Id., at 83. In re Pinsky-Lapin, 98 F. (2d) 776,
778 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); In re Goldman, 62 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
18. Where respondent has objected to the court's summary jurisdiction by asserting an
adverse claim to the property, it is obvious that receipt of the property by respondent
will be thereby admitted.
19. It has been held in some cases that it is sufficient to establish possession on the date
of filing the petition in bankruptcy. Frederick v. Silverman, 250 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 3d,
1918) ; Epstein v. Steinfeld, 210 Fed. 236 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914). The matter of a subsequent
disposal of the property is something to be considered later upon a proceeding to punish
for contempt. These decisions have been properly criticized. S Rm. NGToN, B xiUrtcy
(4th ed. 1936), § 2418--"The correct date, it would seem, is the date of the filing of the
summary petition itself. At any rate it is the earliest date." It would seem, however, since
inability to comply excuses the respondent no matter how reprehensible his conduct has
been, that possession at the date of the issuance of the turnover order is required. Recent
cases, at least impliedly, have taken this view. In re Pinsky-Lapin, 98 F. (2d) 776 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938); Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); In re J. L. Marks
& Co., 85 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); In re Schoenberg, 70 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934).
20. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 362 (1929).
21. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 362 (1929). The proof need not be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
22. "The proceeding is one in which coercive methods by imprisonment are probable
and are foreshadowed." Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 363 (1929).
The turnover order is "not for the payment of a debt, but for the delivery by the
bankrupt of the assets of his estate to his trustee in bankruptcy". In re Schlesinger, 102
Fed. 117, 119 (C. C. A. 2d, 1900). Hence state laws forbidding imprisonment for debt
are not violated. See also Sinsheimer v. Simonson, 107 Fed. 898, 905 (C. C. A. 6tht 1901).
23. Sinsheimer v. Simonson, 107 Fed. 898, 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
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have made it impossible for him to obey. 4 The court in consequence
must approach its consideration of the evidence adduced upon the turnover proceeding with great caution and circumspection.
After a consideration of all the facts, the court may have no doubt
whatsoever in its mind that the property sought by the trustee is part
of the estate in bankruptcy and that the respondent is the one who
made off with it. But does he still have it? The answer to this question
may be shrouded in doubt, and the finding that the respondent once
took the property may or may not help in proving he still has it in his
possession or control. The reason for this may be the length of time
elapsed since the taking or the character of the goods. If $1000 was
abstracted from the coffers of the bankrupt corporation by its president
just before the receiver arrived to take possession, how can the court
know, in the absence of straightforward information from the respondent
or direct proof of the facts, that he still has the money two months
later when a turnover order is applied for? Or two years later? Should
the court's requirement of proof of the respondent's ability to comply
with a turnover order vary as it appears that the property sought was
a stock of perishable vegetables or a diadem of indestructible jewels?
Should it be supposed, in the absence of proof, that the vegetables or
the jewels were sold? If so, how much did they bring and what has
happened to the proceeds? May the respondent, wrongful taker of the
property and the one person who must know what happened to it, sit
by and make no offer of proof on this issue and thus defeat the trustee?
Questions such as these have perplexed the courts. It is the writer's
purpose herein to examine the approach made and the principles applied
in solving the difficulties thus encountered.
Let us pose a problem and see how, under varying circumstances, the
courts might dispose of it. Let us assume that the Black Shoe Corporation, engaged in the retail shoe business, was adjudicated a bankrupt
as a result of a creditors' petition and that a trustee has been elected.
The trustee conducted an investigation into the affairs of the bankrupt
corporation as a result of which it was discovered that one of the corporate books is missing-the retail sales record, let us say. Bank records
establish that on the day before the involuntary petition was filed, Jerome
24. "Thereafter on the motion for commitment the only evidence that can bz considered is the evidence of something that has happened since the turnover order was made
showing that since that time there has newly arisen an inability on the part of the bankrupt to comply with the turnover order." Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 363 (1929).
Prior to Oriel v. Russell suPra, the lower courts in many cases had, upon procecdinp
to punish for contempt, examined into the propriety of the issuance of the turnover order.
These decisions are collected in 5 Rmm~ox, BAzimurcz (4th ed. 1936) § 2428.
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Black, the sole stockholder and managing officer of the bankrupt, withdrew from the corporate bank account the sum of $1000. Taking of
inventory, examination of purchasing records of the bankrupt corporation and other available data have established a shortage of at least
100 pairs of shoes, valued at $500. Let us further assume that on a
date six months subsequent to the filing of the petition, the trustee
applies for an order directing Jerome Black to turn over to him the
missing sales record, the money, and the shoes. An order to show
cause is issued on the trustee's petition and Black is served. 4 ' Black
answers the petition and denies that he ever had possession of any of
the property sought by the trustee. How will the court decide the
controversy?
Books and Records
The trustee has title to all the books and records of the bankrupt.2"
Upon the hearing before the referee, the trustee proves the existence of
the missing sales record by the testimony of an employee of the bankrupt, who frequently saw the book at the bankrupt's place of business
and last saw it there within a few days prior to the bankruptcy."
The witness further testifies without contradiction that Jerome Black
alone had custody of the book. The trustee can produce no witness
who saw Black make off with the book or who has seen it in Black's
possession since the bankruptcy. May the trustee rest his case for
the surrender of the book upon the proof thus far adduced? Has he
made out a prima facie case?
It has been held that it is sufficient for the trustee to trace the book
to the possession of the respondent at the time of the bankruptcy or
just prior thereto.27 Such proof, it is said, gives rise to an inference
that the respondent made off with the book since it would be of no value
to a stranger and may be of great importance to the respondent, as
24a. Due process requires notice to the respondent of the relief sought and reasonable
opportunity to be heard. In re Rosser, 101 Fed. 562 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) ; In re Frank, 182
Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910). See In re Jackson Co., 15 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926);
In re Sugarman, 3 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 11 U. S. C. A. 110.
26. In the absence of such direct evidence of the existence of books and records, It
has been possible to prove their existence by expert testimony to the effect that the
bankrupt's bookkeeping system required such a book or record. Also, books of account
which have come into the trustee's possession, may contain notations of reference to the
other missing records and thus establish the existence of the latter. See In re Marcus Millinery Co., Inc., 37 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
27. In re M. & M. Mfg. Co., 71 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); In re Arctic Leather
Garment Co., 89 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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erstwhile manager of the bankrupt's business..28 Thus it will be inferred
that Black took the sales record since he alone would have an interest
in doing so.29
The taking and concealment by the respondent being thus established
a further inference is raised, in the absence of explanation to the contrary, that respondent has continued in possession of the missing property
down to the date of the turnover proceeding. 0 As a consequence, in
order to prevent the issuance of a turnover order it becomes incumbent
upon the respondent to rebut this inference with credible evidence. 1
His bald denial that he took the book will not do. - An imaginative
account of the loss or destruction of the book which is too much for
the court to believe will not help the respondent. 3 Refusal on the part
of the respondent to explain what happened to the book or to answer
questions on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate
him will be of no avail. 34
Thus we see that the trustee, who has the initial duty to trace the
missing book to the respondent's possession, sustains that duty by
showing the existence of the book in the possession of the respondent at
or near the time of the bankruptcy. There then arises an inference of
continued possession which is regarded as an inference of fact"s and is
2S. ". . . books are absolutely useless to any one but the bankrupt and may be vitalIy
important to him.... Thus, upon satisfying the judge that they were at hand until just
before a trustee or receiver took possession, no conclusion is reasonably possible but that
he took them." In re Arctic Leather Garment Co., 89 F. (2d) 871, 872 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937). The inference is one of fact, a logical conclusion from the evidentiary facts.
29. The fact that respondent had a motive for concealing the record is of asistance
to the trustee in proving the ultimate fact of the taking. I re Al. & M. Mfg. Co.,
71 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
30. "When property is traced into a bankrupt's possession shortly before bankruptcy,
his failure to produce it or to explain what became of it, supports an inference that
it is still subject to his control, and justifies the entry of a turnover order." In re M. & M.
Mfg. Co., id. at 141. See In re Jackson Co., 15 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
31. In re Goldberg, 91 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
32. In re AT. & Ml. Mfg. Co., cited note 29 supra. The court in In re Marcus Millinery

Co., Inc., cited note 26 supra, indicated its belief that the obvious falsity of the reapondent's
testimony evidenced a fraudulent concealment of the records in question. The only ex-

press reference to the requirement of present possession or control is found in the con-

cluding sentence of the opinion, ". . . if the appellants have the will to comply with it
(the order), the ability to do so should not be wanting." Id. at p. 95.

33. In re Arctic Leather Garment Co., cited note 28 supra; In re Marcus, cited note 26
supra; United States v. Moore, 294 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); see In re Jackson Co.,
15 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
34. Dittmar v. Michelson, 281 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).

35. There is a well recognized distinction between an inference of fact which is a
logical deduction from the evidentiary facts and a real presumption which is a rule of law.
9 WicmoRE, EvDmn-cE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2491.
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deemed sufficient to make out the trustee's prima facie case on the further
requirement of possession or control by the respondent at the time of
the turnover proceeding. It is the respondent's obligation to rebut this
inference of continued possession. It has been said that the strict burden
of proof on the question of present possession always remains with the
trustee who has the affirmative of the issue and that the respondent has
the duty merely to go forward and neutralize the inference that has
arisen.30 Whether the so-called inference is a justified conclusion of
fact flowing from the proof so far adduced by the trustee or is instead
a real presumption or rule of law to regulate the conduct of the proceeding will be studied later.
An examination of the decisions where the turnover proceeding involved the production of books and records of the bankrupt reveals that
the trustee has uniformly met success where he has traced the books to
respondent's possession, unless the respondent has gone forward with
evidence to show his present inability to surrender them. It has been
suggested that the reason for this may lie in the nature of the property
whose return is sought by the trustee. 7 The books seem to be regarded
as having more permanence than money or saleable merchandise. Thus,
in our hypothetical case, it is probable that, if Black persists in his
denial that he ever took the missing sales record and says no more, the
trustee will succeed in getting a turnover order against Black for the
surrender of the book. The only way Black may avoid the issuance of
the order is by abandoning his position on the issue of the taking and
showing by credible proof that something has happened since he took
the book which makes it impossible for him now to surrender it to the
trustee.
Money
Let us now pass to a consideration of the proceeding insofar as it concerns the trustee's effort to compel Black to surrender the sum of $1000.
We have assumed that through the production of bank records and the
examination of witnesses the trustee has established the withdrawal by
Black of $1000 from the funds of Black Shoe Corporation on the day
36.

Sheinman v. Chalmers, 33 F. (2d) 902, 904 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).

But the court

seemed to regard the granting of the turnover order as inevitable unless the respondent
took up his burden. The court said: "This burden he may assume or ignore as he may
wish, but he will suffer the consequences of not taking it up and carrying it." Id. at 904.
37. "Thus in the case of chattels which have no value, like books of account, it Is

enough to show that he (the respondent) has secreted them (citing cases). The chance
that he has destroyed them is deemed too remote to impose upon the trustee the duty
of disproving it by anticipation." Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. (2d) 424. 426 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 641, (1938) 7 FoxRDR L. REV. 294.
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before the petition in bankruptcy was filed.38 Does such proof make out
a prima facie case for the trustee? Does there arise an inference of continued possession of the money, even as in the case of the missing sales
record?
Though the trustee has surmounted the initial hurdle by the necessary margin of clear and convincing proof, it is clear that an order to
turn over the sum of $1000 should not issue against Black if to do so
would be to demand an impossibilityl But has the trustee the obligation to prove in the first instance that the entire sum or some definite
part of it is still in Black's possession or must Black at his peril take the
lead and show that he no longer has the money and that compliance with
the proposed turnover order would be therefore impossible?
In our supposed state of facts, Black has denied in his answer to the
trustee's petition that he ever received the money. It has been held in a
number of cases, where the respondent denied receiving the property or
refused any explanation, that the trustee, after prevailing on the initial
issue of the taking, may rest without any further proof being required
of him on the issue of continued possession, " the burden of explanation
being thrown upon the respondent.4 '
In the case of Danish v. Sofranski this line of cases was noticed and
an attempt was made to find the reason for the rule that charges the respondent with the duty of explanation. After emphasizing that the cases
involved fact situations where the respondent denied having ever re3S. Of course, it will be the rare case, where such convincing proof is so readily
available. More often the money taken will be cash receipts of the busine:3 and will
continue over a period of time, and the culprit will be more efficient in destroying dues.
39. Present possession or control of the money at the time of the turnover order must
be established. In re Redbord, 3 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); In re Holden, 203
Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Sinsheimer v. Simonson, 107 Fed. 893 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
40. In re Weinreb, 146 Fed. 243 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); In re Steinreich As-sociates, 83
F. (2d) 2S4, 2S (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), where the court said: "There is no question of any'
adverse claim to the money. The appellant simply says he never had it. Accepting as
we do the finding that he did have it, it follows that in the absence of any explanation
as to what he has done with it, he is subject to summary order to turn it over to the
trustee; the inference being that he still has it in his possession or under his control."
Cf. Dittmar v. Michelson, 281 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
41. In re Steinreich Associates, cited note 40 supra; Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. (2d)
424, 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), where the court said: "At other times in the summary
proceeding itself, the respondent either denies having ever received the property or reu es
to give any explanation; and then too the trustee need not prove his ability to comply;
the burden of explanation is the respondent's." See also In re Meier, 182 Fed. 799 (C. C. A.
8th, 1910).
42. 93 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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ceived the property or refused to give any explanation, the court went
on to say:
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"The ground for this has never been stated, but a valid explanation is that,
as the supposed excuse would contradict his denial, it may be assumed that
he would not make it; and that his refusal to answer, when he so refuses,
may be assumed to continue. Logically no doubt there is still a hiatus, but
the respondent may be said to have removed the issue from the case.1 44
In the Danish case the respondents, who were respectively president
and secretary-treasurer of the bankrupt corporation, and with their
wives owned all its stock, admitted they had received over $2500 from
the bankrupt corporation in the form of withdrawals and dividends over
the course of some seven months prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy. They attempted to justify the receipt of the money and to
establish their status as adverse claimants so as to defeat the court's summary jurisdiction. The circumstances left no doubt, however, that they
were engaged in a fraudulent scheme to loot the corporation against
the day when a claim long in suit would become a judgment. The objection to the court's jurisdiction was accordingly overruled. The respondents gave no evidence as to what happened to the money. The money
was withdrawn in the period between October 1934 and March 1935.
The bankruptcy adjudication was made May 2, 1935 but the turnover
order not until March 2, 1937.4 Despite the lapse of over two years,
the referee granted an order directing the respondents to turn over the
sum of $2532. The order of the referee, as amended on July 15, 1937,
was affirmed by the District Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order, for the reason that there was
"a fair doubt whether any of the money which they took remained unspent
two years later; and if any did, it is impossible even to guess how much it
was; the chances4 are that it was all gone, but it would be the merest fancy to
fix an amount."
The fact that in the Danish case the respondents admitted receipt of
the money was held to distinguish it from the situation where the
respondent denies ever having received it and the court took the position
43. Id. at p. 426, per Learned Hand, J.
44. Compare the concurring opinion of Learned Hand, J. in In re Pinsky-Lapin Co.,
98 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
45. Upon appeal to the District Court from the order of March 2, 1937, the proceeding was returned to the Referee, who corrected the previous order by reducing the
sum in question from $3,282.80 to $2,532.80. The corrective order was dated July 15, 1937
and it was from said order that the appeal was taken.
46. 93 F. (2d) 424, 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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that, whereas in the latter case it is not necessary for the trustee to
prove continued possession or control, in the former that burden is
upon the trustee.' As the court said:
"The trustee must make out his case upon this issue just as he must upon
the original taking." 48
If the distinction between the duties of proof consequent upon denying rather than admitting receipt of the money be accepted, it would follow that in our hypothetical case the situation of the respondent, Black,
would be different if, instead of a general denial of possession at any
time, he should admit that he took the money, asserting that in his
belief the financial condition of the corporation was sound and as sole
stockholder of the corporation he had the right to pay himself a dividend, or simply admit receipt of the money and assume an agnostic
attitude towards its disposal. If the distinction be accepted, it would seem
that, simply by a change of tactics without any change in the merits, the
respondent Black could place a greater burden upon the trustee by
requiring him to establish how much, if any, of the money remained on
hand at the time of the turnover order.
The validity of the distinction made in the Danish case was called in
question in In re Pinsky-Lapin Co.,40 decided by the same court5 0
47. One of the cases cited by the court as an instance where the taking of the property
was admitted was In re J. L. Marks & Co., 85 F. (2d) 392 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936). There
the respondent, president and sole stockholder of the bankrupt corporation, admitted
the receipt of 6,5O0, the proceeds of two checks drawn to the order of the bankrupt.
One check in the sum of $2,50D was cashed August 4, 1933; another for 4,X0 was cashed
August 17, 1933. The respondent testified that the money so received was all paid out
during August to customers of the bankrupt so that on September 2, 1933) when the
petition in bankruptcy was filed, he had nothing left from the proceeds of the checks.
The lower court on March 10, 1936, over two and one half years later, granted a turnover order for the surrender of $6,500. The order was reversed, the circuit court not
being "satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that he pasessed the
money either at the time the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted or when the order
to turn over the money was entered." Nothing was said about an inference of continued
possession. It was unnecessary for the court to consider the issue of posseszion at the
time of the turnover order for there was no proof that the bankrupt had the money
when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. Hence it was not established that the money
ever existed as an asset of the estate. Furthermore, the respondent did not refuse to go
forward and explain what happened to the money. The Marks case cannot therefore
give support to the proposition for which it was cited in the Danish case.
48. 93 F. (2d) 424, 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
49. 93 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
50. In the Danish case the court was composed of Manton, Learned Hand, and Swan,
Circuit Judges, with judge Learned Hand writing the opinion. In the Pin-aky-Lapin Case
the court was composed of Learned Hand, Augustus N. Hand, and Chase, Circuit Judges,
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within nine months of the Danish case. There the court restated the
distinction5 and criticized it as follows:
"It seems to us that such distinction cannot determine whether a 'turnover'
order should issue. Where he denies receiving, but the court finds that he
did receive, we think that the result is legally the same as where he concedes
possession. In each case there is ex hypothesi a finding of possession, in one
based on an admission, in the other based on proof so compelling that the
denial is of no avail. In each situation we think there is the same burden on
the trustee to prove possession at the time of the making of the 'turnover' order.
The result is determined either by evidence of possession at the time of the
order or by the strength of the inference of continued possession, once
possession is conceded or found to exist at the time of adjudication. The
strength of the inference depends on the circumstances, which include the
amount and nature of the property, the time which has elapsed, and the credibility of any explanation which the respondent may give. A distinction between
the burden imposed on the trustee in cases where misappropriation by a respondent is admitted, and in cases where it is found to exist in spite of his
denial, is a strong inducement to a fraudulent respondent to choose the former
alternative. It is bound to become a favorite method of avoiding 'turnover'
orders in cases which do not differ essentially from those of unqualified denials
of receiving except in the favorable result to the guilty party. ' 2
While technically this criticism of the Danish case may be classified
as obiter, it is so strong and deliberate as to leave no doubt of the court's
purpose to depart from the position taken in the former decision. Judge
Learned Hand so regarded the Pinsky-Lapin opinion,"3 and, writing separately, reaffirmed his personal conviction that the doctrine of the
Danish case was right. 4
This criticism of the distinction drawn in the Danish case may well
be considered sound, for, if the law requires the trustee to shoulder the
burden of proving present possession, he should not be absolved from it
with Judge Augustus N. Hand writing the opinion. Judge Learned Hand in the PinskyLapin case wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred in the result reached by the
court. See note 44 supra.
51. "In Danish v. Sofranski, 2 Cir., 93 F. (2d) 424, the distinction is made between
a complete denial by a respondent that he has ever received property of a bankrupt and
an acknowledgment that he has received the property, where in each instance he has
failed to account for its disposal. It is said that in the former situation the trustee need
not prove the ability of the respondent to comply with a 'turnover' order but that in
the latter he must." In re Pinsky-Lapin, 98 F. (2d) 776, 780 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
52. Ibid.
53.

".

.

. I cannot see how our decision in Danish v. Sofranski, 2 Cir. 93 F. (2d)

424, is material here; any comment upon it is inevitably obiter. But since my brothers
think it desirable to overrule it, I wish to dissent pro tanto."
54. 98 F. (2d) 776, 781 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
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by the position assumed by the respondent on the separate issue of the
taking." The Pinsky-Lapin case seems definitely to place upon the
trustee the strict burden of establishing in all cases possession by the
respondent at the time of the order. If direct evidence of continued
possession is available to the trustee, that will probably sustain the
burden and carry the day. In many cases, however, the trustee will
be left to rely upon the so-called inference of continued possession, the
strength of which is said to vary with the circumstances. In the PinsyLapin case the court seems to have in mind a true inference of fact,
rather than a procedural rule or true presumption which is designed to
assist the trustee by compelling the respondent to assume, at his peril,
a duty of proof. Whether there is any logical foundation for the inference of continued possession as drawn from the established fact of the
taking may well be doubted, but a discussion of the worth of the inference may well be reserved at this point.
Whereas the Pinsky-Lapin case may be regarded as increasing the
trustee's task by weakening the inference upon which he may be forced
to rely as his sole support, the fact that the burden is not insuperable
is demonstrated in the Pinsky-Lapin case, itself, where, among the items
sought by the trustee, money in the sum of $591.14 was ordered turned
over to the trustee, in spite of a lapse of a considerable period of time
between the taking and the turnover order. The moneys were taken in
a period between two and four months prior to the adjudication, and the
turnover order was made nine months after adjudication. The referee
found in the face of respondent's denial that his possession or control
of the moneys had continued up to the time of the order-a conclusion
which the appellate court was unwilling to upset.r0 Apparently the
trustee's method of proving the amount of money still on hand will have
to be guided by the facts of each case. Cases decided since In re PinskyLapin have asserted that circumstantial evidence will suffice" and that
55. judge Learned Hand in Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937)
admitted that to dispense with proof by the trustee on the issue of present poaseszion in
a case where respondent denies ever receiving the property involved a logical hiatus. And
in In re Pinsky-Lapin, 98 F. (2d) 776, 781 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) the judge conceded there
was "a slip in the formal reasoning."
56. "A contrary conclusion on our part would be giving too much weight to things
we know nothing about and too little weight to an inference drawn by the referee as to
continued possession of the property", 98 F. (2d) 776, 7F0 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). The
inference of continued possession was here somewhat bolstered by testimony of the
respondent which limited his expenditures and thus reduced the possibility of his having
spent the money.
57. In re Fisher, 32 F. Supp. 69 (D. C. Md. 1940).
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the courts must be reasonable in their requirement of proof.58 On the
other hand, it seems obvious that the trustee's efforts to get a turnover
order for money are doomed to defeat in many cases where the tightlipped respondent has so successfully covered his trail that a long period
of time must necessarily elapse before his depredations can be discovered and a turnover proceeding commenced against him. The longer
the respondent's guile can delay the commencement of the turnover proceeding the weaker will be the inference of continued possession and consequently, the greater the respondent's chances for success. Such a result
is undesirable as placing a premium upon craft.
Returning to our hypothetical case of the Black Shoe Corporation,
what will be the result insofar as the money is concerned? If the doctrine of the Danish case had not been overruled, we have seen that
Black could impede the trustee's efforts to make him disgorge his loot
by admitting the taking and refusing any credible testimony about
present possession. But, whether he admits or denies the taking, under
the Pinsky-Lapin case the burden of proving present possession is on
the trustee who is, however, aided by an inference that respondent has
continued in possession of the loot. Will this inference be enough to
justify the granting of a turnover order against Black in default of
any credible explanation from him as to what happened to the money?
It is difficult to say, because thera may be such a doubt in the court's
mind of Black's ability to comply that the order will be refused, despite
the fact that the money was traced to Black who has declined to tell
what happened to it. If the sum of $2000 was taken three months
ago the order might well issue, possibly with a deduction for living
expenses if it were shown that Black had no other income. But if two
years had passed, the order would in all probability be refused. What
if the sum were $100 and one month had passed? Where the line should
be drawn is hard to say. If the respondent will but take the stand
and tell a credible story of how the money was spent, he may relieve
himself of any possibility of a turnover order being made against him.
58. "How far a trustee can produce evidence of the bankrupt's having money in
his possession at the date of the turnover order as the opinion in Danish v. Sofranski,
2 Cir., 93 F. (2d) 424, probably requires (subject, however, to Re Pinsky-Lapin Co., 2
Cir., 98 F. (2d) 776), is an interesting question about which much might be written.
Certain it is that the bankrupt who will admit that he has the money which he has been
called upon to disgorge, would be so rare a curiosity that he would never be encountered in the flesh by a Referee in Bankruptcy. Consequently a District Judge must be
satisfied with something less than the performance of a miracle by a trustee in the presentation of his case." In re Hersh, 29 F. Supp. 274, 276 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) per
Byers, D. J.
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Perhaps it is because the respondent cannot help himself by his testimony that he remains silent-perhaps it is this consideration that is at
the root of the inference of continued possession. But under the law
as it now stands, the respondent who has made away with money cannot
be compelled to speak under pain of inevitable defeat. The trustee
may fail to get his turnover order despite the respondent's failure to
give an explanation. Certain it is that, the trustee cannot be near so
confident of getting a turnover order for the money as he can for the
missing sales record.
Saleable Merchandise
Now to consider the trustee's application for the return of the shoes.
We assume that the trustee is able to establish the shortage of at least
100 pairs of shoes by an analysis of the purchasing records and other
books of account of the bankrupt though, of course, he is handicapped
by the absence of the sales record.59 If available evidence leaves some
doubt as to the precise amount of merchandise taken, the court will
protect the respondent by reducing it to a minimum." Thus the trustee
has again passed the initial barrier and has established the respondent's
possession of the missing merchandise at a time near the bankruptcy.
But he can prove no more, the subsequent history of the shoes being
unknown to him. Does an inference of continued possession again arise
so as to complete the trustee's prima facie case?
The courts have held in a number of cases that once the abstraction
of the merchandise is established, there arises, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of what became of it, an inference of continued
possession and concealment sufficient to justify the granting of a turnover order."' In It re Magers, a leading decision in the second circuit, the court expressed itself as follows:
59. The misappropriation of the goods is usually established by some such method.
In re Cohan, 41 F. (2d) 632, 633 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). It is not often that direct evidence
of the taking is at hand as in the case of In re Briklod, D. C. N. Y. No. 72426 (unreported), where a policeman saw the bankrupt packing cases all Sunday night and shipping
the goods off early Monday morning. Cf. Cooper v. Dasher, 290 U. S. 105, 103 (1933);
Kirsner v. Taliaferro, 202 Fed. 51, 56, 57 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912).
60. In re Cohan, 41 F. (2d) 632, 633 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); In re Glacsberg, 59 F. (2d)
209 (S.D. N. Y. 1932). Cf. In re Schlesinger, 102 Fed. 117 (C. C. A. 2d, 19G), Vwhere
money was taken and the court reduced the sum to a minimum of $6,50 "to be entirely
within the limits of any possible doubt."
61. In re David Eisner & Co., 22 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N. Y. 1938) ; In re Mur-Mo Dress,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 12 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); It re Glassberg, 59 F. (2d) 209, 211 (S.D.
N. Y. 1932); In re Magen, 10 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) and cases there cited; In re
Chavkin, 249 Fed. 342 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Kirsner v. Taliaferro, 202 Fed. 51 (C. C. A.
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"Unscheduled property traced to one, who received it before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, may be presumed to continue in such possession, until a
credible explanation is made, showing what has become of such property."0

Although the term "presumed" is used, the inference is regarded not
as a presumption of law but rather as one of fact based upon a combination of the proof of the taking and the absence of explanation,"5
although the absence of explanation from the respondent has sometimes
received greater emphasis than the proof of the pilfering of the goods."4

However, the inference has not always brought success to the trustee
for circumstances may be such as to bar an inference of continued

possession, as where it is equally probable that the merchandise may
have been disposed of, and there the court will refuse to draw the infer-

ence despite the respondent's failure to explain what happened to the
goods.ea
4th, 1912); In re Levy, 142 Fed. 442 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905). See In re Gordon & Gelberg,
69 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) where the court found respondent had overturned the
presumption by the evidence presented.
62. 10 F. (2d) 91, 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
63. In the Magen case cited note 62 supra, at 93, the court described the foundation
of the inference as follows: "If a bankrupt is shown to have purchased large amounts
of property within a short period prior to his bankruptcy, and has only a nominal
amount 'in his possession at the time of his bankruptcy, and is unable or unwilling to
explain what he has done with it, it is not unreasonable to infer that he has it In concealment. As proof of a fact the law permits inferences from other facts, and there arises
a presumption of fact, which is a reasonable and natural inference of the existence of one
fact from the proof of some other fact established by direct evidence." In rc Cohan,
41 F. (2d) 632, 633 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). See also L. Hand, J., concurring in In rc
Pinsky-Lapin, 98 F. (2d) 776, 781 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
64. See In re Glassberg, 59 F. (2d) 209, 211 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); In re Levy, 142 Fed.
442, 444 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905).
65. In re Schoenberg, 70 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). The property sought by
the trustee had been transferred about a year before by the bankrupt to a newly organized personal corporation, the respondent in the turnover proceeding. The court found
that "the corporation is a mere cloak for the bankrupt and its adverse claim merely colorable." A turnover order granted below was reversed. The court at p. 323 said: "In the
case at bar the trustee made no attempt to show what part of the merchandise originally
transferred was still on hand or that the appellant had the sum of money which in the
alternative it was directed to pay over. The corporation had been conducting the busines
for more than a year; its books were not called for by the trustee; so far as appears,
the proceeds received from disposal of the merchandise may have been used in business
expenses and paying merchandise creditors." The court stated the Magen case was Inapplicable because here there was "no evidence of any concealment of merchandise or
money." The validity of such a distinction may well be doubted. The rules for proof
of the taking of the goods and present possession thereof should not be made to vary as
the taking is brazen and barefaced rather than secret and stealthy.
In re Schoenberg supra was one of the cases cited in Danish v. Sofranski cite note 57
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The distinction drawn in Danish v. SoJranski between the consequences of admitting rather than denying the taking, together with the
criticism thereof in the Pinsky-Lapin case, had reference to saleable
goods as well as to money 0 It was there intimated that since the merchandise may readily be disposed of, the inference of continued
possession is not entirely dependable, especially where the lapse of time
has been substantial. The view that the strength of the inference will
vary with the character of the goods and the amount of elapsed time
undoubtedly has force if, as the courts have done, we consider the inference to be one of fact.0 7 For example, if the goods taken from the estate
were fruits and vegetabless or meats and provisions,' 0 it is evident that
an inference of continued possession by respondent would be well nigh
impossible even after the lapse of but a short time. Such a case further
demonstrates the impropriety of the distinction drawn in Danish v. Sofranski and hereinabove commented upon, for if the fruit, even with
modern refrigeration, would not last more than a week, then the court
should not infer that it is still in respondent's possession months later
when a turnover proceeding is brought, and respondent's admission or
denial of the taking can have no bearing on the strength of the inference.
But goods and merchandise do not have to be inherently perishable to
disappear. It is a fair assumption that the man who has taken merchandise from the estate will turn it into cash at his earliest opportunity.
Perhaps in the light of this probability, it is the common practice to
apply for an order in the alternative directing a surrender of the merchandise or its proceeds.70 If it thereafter develops that the goods
were sold, the order may direct the surrender of the proceeds.' A decree
in the alternative is sometimes made without requiring any proof that a
sale was actually made.7' Where this is done, it would seem tantamount
infra, as an instance where the abstraction of the property was conceded and the tru-tee
has in consequence the burden of proving present possession.
66. Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. (2d) 424, 426 (C.C. A. 2d, 1937); In re Pins.hy-Lapin,
9S F. (2d) 776, 780 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
67. See note 63 supra.
68. Cf. In re West Produce Corporation, 33 F. Supp. 991 (E. D. N. Y. 1940).
69. See In re Korin, 25 F. Supp. 323 (E. D. N. Y. 193S).
70. Reiss v. Reardon, 18 F. (2d) 200 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927); In re Chavkin, 249 Fed.
342 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); In re Cohan, 41 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930), vhere the
court found it proper to grant an order for the surrender of "the precise goods concealed
or their concealed proceeds." See In re Fisher, 32 F. Supp. 69, 72 (D. C. Did. 1940).
71. Reiss v. Reardon, 18 F. (2d) 200 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927); cf. Elrzeh v. Schilling 28
F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
72. See In re Cohan, 41 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); In re Levy, 142 F. 442
(C. C. A. 2d, 1905).
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to a confession that the court doesn't know what the present status really
is.73 When such a decree is made, it is obvious that obedience is impossible, if the merchandise has actually been disposed of, unless the specified
sum of money be on hand for surrender to the trustee. But, there being
no proof of a sale, there is of course no proof of the price at which the
goods were sold. The goods may have been sold at a sacrifice price, or
on the other hand at a handsome profit. This difficulty is sometimes
avoided by granting an order for the surrender of the goods or their
valge. 4 Such an alternative order would seem to be the result of a
guess that the proceeds of the sale equalled'the value of the merchandise
sold, since the trustee would have a right to the money only if it represented the missing merchandise under a change of form. However, if
the goods were disposed of otherwise than by sale or if a sale actually
brought a price less than the value of the goods, then the effect of the
order is to grant a money judgment against the wrongdoer for damages
suffered by the estate, a function which is beyond the scope of the summary proceeding." Such an alternative order would seem open to the
same criticism that is levelled at a turnover order for a sum of money
alone, being the value of concealed assets, in a case where there is no
proof that a sale was actually made.7 6 It has been suggested that the
proper understanding of such an alternative decree is that it merely gives
the respondent an option to pay the value.7 7 Again this would seem a
perversion of the true function of the turnover proceeding, namely to
73. Cf. In re Sax, 141 Fed. 223 (E. D. Pa. 1905).
74. In re Eisner, 22 F. Supp. 746 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Kirsner v. Taliaferro, 202 Fed.
51 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912). Cf. In re West Produce Corp., 33 F. Supp. 991 (E. D. N. Y.
1940), where the District Judge sent the proceeding back to the Referee "to take proof
of the present value" of the goods.
75. 5 REMzINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1936) § 2423, where it is said that an order
in the alternative for the goods or their proceeds is proper but not when it is for the
goods or their valute.
76. Samuel v. Dodd, 142 Fed. 68 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906); In re Goldman, 62 F. (2d)
421 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; In re Miller & Harbaugh, 54 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
77. In re Goldman, 62 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932); "In some instances where
the bankrupt has been found to have concealed merchandise of a certain value, he has
been ordered to turn it over, but has been given the option of paying over its value in
cash." Ibid. p. 424. In re David Eisner, 22 F. Supp. 746 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). The District
Court in the Magen case, cited note 62 supra, affirmed the referees order for the surrender
of "the said silk and cotton yarn of the value of $32,779.74, or, at the option of the
respondent, in lieu of the said merchandise, to pay to the said trustee, within the said
period of five days, the sum of $32,779.74 in cash." No point was raised as to the form
of the order and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The mention of the value of
the property may sometimes be made for the purpose of identification. As such it is
unobjectionable.
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recover assets of the estate in respondent's possession, for it permits
the respondent to buy his way out by contributing a sum of money which
may bear no relation to the proceeds of his loot. 8 A new provision"°
in the Bankruptcy Act may give some assistance to the trustee in
fixing the amount of the proceeds of a sale of the goods by raising a
rebuttable presumption that property sold by the bankrupt was sold at
not less than cost. The degree of its effectiveness would seem difficult
to predict at this time.so
Either the respondent has the goods or he has disposed of them. 1
Unless the court is just guessing instead of relying on a valid inference
of fact, it would seem that the order should be restricted to the goods,
in a case where no sale is proved, or where a sale is proved, then the
2
order should be definite in requiring a surrender of the proceeds.
The tendency to make a turnover order in the alternative seems to be
an implied admission that the inference of continued possession is
unreliable.
73. In Kirsner v. Taliaferro, 202 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912) the order directed the
surrender of merchandise, consisting of dry goods, notions and ladies clothing "to the
value of at least $4,166.54 wholesale price" or, in the alternative, payment of $3.00 in
cash, which the court fixed as the equivalent cash value of the goods. The respondent
objected to the alternative form of the order. The court answered that he could not
complain about having the option. "He need not avail himself of it, if he does not wish
to do so. He can be in no way injured by being allowed to pay the money if he wants
to." Ibid. at 58.
79. Bankruptcy Act § 21 (1); 11 U. S. C. A. 44 (1).
go. In the first place, the section applies by its terms only where the bankrupt is the
respondent. The presumption would probably not apply where the respondent was a
third party, though what interpretation would be given the section where the respondent
was an officer of a bankrupt corporation may be in doubt. This section should be read in
connection with Sec. 7a (11) of the Bankruptcy Act which requires the bankrupt, when so
ordered, to file a cost inventory. See H. R. Ri. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Ses. (1937)
25, 26; Wams
, THE BAN muPTcy Acr oF 1938 (1938) 35, 36.
81. Cf. Samuel v. Dodd, 142 Fed. 68 (C. C. A. 5th, 1905).
82. Cf. In re Elias, 240 Fed. 448, 460 (E. D. N. C. 1917) where the folloving comment was made on the court's speculation when it grants a turnover order for merchandise or its value without definite proof that a sale was made; "The concluson that
he had the goods or their equivalent, in money, on February 1, 1917, or at this time,
is based upon the presumption or inference of his possession of them May 4th, 1916.
Discarding his answer and looking at the question from the reason of the thing, reasonably
natural deductions based upon what is apparent, I would find difficulty in reaching the
conclusion that he now has the specific goods which I feel certain he had May 4, 1916,
or the specific money which he received for them, if sold. To find that he now has
the money would require a presumption that he sold the goods, and a further presumption
that he received $4,047.90 in,money for them and the further presumption that he had,
and now has, the identical money which he received. This would violate a well-knozm
rule of evidence which forbids the indulgence of a presumption upon a presumption!'
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Furthermore, if there is justification for the hesitancy to grant turnover orders for money-owing to the fact that our common knowledge
of how fast money goes weakens the inference of continued possessionthe same consideration should make the court equally hesitant to grant
a turnover order for merchandise or its proceeds. If the merchandise
was saleable, it may well have been sold and if, for all the court knows, it
may thus have been converted into money, the situation met by the
trustee is practically on a par with the case where money was the
subject of the original taking. However, such a hesitancy on the part
of the court seems not to be so marked in cases involving merchandise
as it is where money was taken and, as the law now stands, the probability is that in our hypothetical case Black would be ordered to surrender the shoes or the proceeds of their sale, unless he explains what
happened to the shoes. If his explanation is that he sold them he must
explain what became of the proceeds.
Apportionment of the Duty of Proof
Throughout our discussion thus far a consideration of the nature of
the inference of continued possession, its reliability and the propriety of
the duty of proof which it casts upon respondent has been merely the
subject of passing comment, a more complete discussion being reserved.
Accordingly, we shall now proceed to a consideration and analysis of
the inference of continued possession which is such a prominent factor
in the turnover cases.
There is no doubt but that the trustee who seeks a turnover order
has the burden of tracing the assets of the bankrupt estate to the respondent's possession. If he fails to do so, his petition is certain to be
denied. The burden of proving the abstraction is usually a heavy one.
The trustee, elected by creditors of the bankrupt to represent them, is
almost invariably a stranger to the bankrupt's affairs. Unfamiliar as
he is with the bankrupt's business and bookkeeping methods, the trustee
often labors under severe handicaps in mastering the situation and
tracking down clues to missing assets. He has to deal with bankrupts
who have a profound scorn for truthful testimony. 3 Persistent grilling
The court went on to say that "an order based upon an alternative finding cannot be
made the basis of an order of commitment for contempt."
83. "The stories of bankrupts who conceal assets have assumed a form almost as
conventional as the plots one finds in the plays of Plautus and Terence. Indeed, if they
were told with art and possessed more fertility of imagination, a new anthology might
be gathered for American literature from the bankruptcy field. As it is, they contain
little more than standardized forms of falsehood so often reiterated as to be neither
credible nor interesting"; per Augustus N. Hand, J., in In re Abesbaum, 70 F. (2d) 628
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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of unwilling witnesses8 4 and accountant's analyses of incomplete and misleading records are necessary to point out the wrongdoer. The identification of the culprit and his booty must be definite, not doubtful, and
must measure up to the requirement of clear and convincing proof."
Throughout our discussion we have assumed that the trustee has succeeded in his arduous task of proving that the respondent is the one who
made off with the missing assets. It is hoped that such assumption has
not had the effect of minimizing the difficulty involved.
Having established the taking, what more should be required of the
trustee? Shall he have the burden also to establish possession at the
time of the turnover proceeding? Clearly he has the affirmative of that
issue. Considerable though his difficulties may have been in proof of the
taking, it is easy to understand how in the average case they would be
slight by comparison with those to be encountered if the trustee must
affirmatively establish in the first instance as part of his prima facie
case that the respondent still has the property. Of course, in the rare
case where direct proof of present possession or lack of it is available
to the trustee, the difficulties we have been considering do not arise.
We have seen that the trustee is aided in completing his case by the
so-called inference of continued possession. The somewhat uncertain
effect of this inference has been considered in the preceding pages. The
Pinsky-Lapin decision 8" has warned that this inference is by no means
a guaranty of success by the trustee. The inference has been regarded
as one of fact-a conclusion of fact deducible from other facts proved
in the proceeding-and, upon analysis, appears to be attributed to
two distinct factors: first, proof that the respondent made away with
the property; second, failure of the respondent to explain what happened to it."'
Is the inference of present possession justified as an inference of fact?
Does proof of the taking, the first stone upon which it rests, afford a
solid foundation for the conclusion of present possession? It is submitted that from the mere fact of the taking, it is a mistake, or at least
a guess, to conclude that the culprit still has his loot. It must be borne
in mind that we are not concerned with a standard of action or an average; with the question of whether the wrongdoer ought to have the
property or whether in the average case he would still have it on hand.
84. Examinations under Section 21a of the Bankruptcy Act constitute a weapon upon
which the trustee must rely heaily in the course of his investigation.

8s5. Oriel v. RussellH, 278 U. S. 35S (1929).
86. 98 F. (2d) 776 (C. C. A. 2d, 193S).
87. See notes 63, 64 supra.
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We are concluding that in a definite instance a certain individual has
specific property which he is called upon to surrender. The conclusion
or inference of continued possession has no logical foundation because
based on a false major premise--"All wrongdoers hold on to their loot"
-- clearly false because at war with the facts of experience. It may be
urged that, conceding the lack of certainty about the inference, it is
nevertheless some evidence of continued possession. But evidence must
have a tendency to prove the ultimate fact, and even if that tendency
were here present, it would be so conjectural as to fall far short of the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence, in the absence of which
no turnover order should issue.8"
Is the inference justified by the second factor to which it has been
attributed-namely, the failure of the respondent to explain what happened to the property? In the first place, it may be noted that if
we view the inference as an aid to the trustee in making out his prima
facie case so as to defeat a motion to dismiss the proceeding at the end
of his evidence, then the failure of the respondent's case should not yet
be weighed in the balance. The respondent's case is yet to be heard.
The question raised by the motion to dismiss is whether the state of
the proof requires the respondent to present any case at all. But disregarding that point in favor of the informal nature of this non-jury
proceeding, what can be the reason for penalizing the respondent for
his failure to speak? If the trustee is to gain by the respondent's
failure to explain, it must be because the respondent was remiss in performing some duty that was upon him.
We have demonstrated that such a duty cannot be attributed to any
necessity of counteracting or neutralizing evidence of present possession
offered by the trustee, for the trustee has merely proved the taking. The
duty of explanation must have some other source. Charging the respondent with present possession of the property if he fails to explain its
loss is justified only if he is under a duty to speak about the matter.
It is submitted that it is perfectly proper to place such a duty upon the
88.

In United States v. Moore, 294 Fed. 852 (C.C. A. 2d, 1923), it was established that

certain books of account had been taken by respondent. The court stated there was a
presumption that they continued in his possession and that the burden was upon him satisfactorily to account for them. Said the court, "This is in accordance with the rule that
the proof of the existence at a particular time of a fact of a continuous nature gives
rise to an inference that it exists at a subsequent time" Ibid at 857. The precise difficulty
however is that the rule as stated does not apply because possession of the property is
not "a fact of a continuous nature"--certainly not if the property is cash or saleable
merchandise nor even in the case of books of account, the quick destruction of which
may best serve respondent's purposes. Cf. 9 WIOoRE, EvIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2530.
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respondent because he has peculiar knowledge of the subsequent history
of the property which has been traced to his possession. It is only reasonable to call upon a party to the suit to divulge that information which
may be exclusively within his knowledge. As Lord Mansfield has said:
"All evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the
power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other side to have
contradicted.""

:But if this is the source of the respondent's duty of explanation, the
trustee, in proving present possession of the property, should not be
forced to rely upon a rational inference of fact?" flowing from other facts
proved in the proceeding. Rather he should be assisted in making out
his prima facie case by a real presumption,"1 which should be frankly
labeled a rule of law placing a duty upon the respondent to tell what
happened to the goods-not because the trustee has offered evidence
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary by respondent, would
justify a conclusion of continued possession, but because the respondent
must divulge the information which is peculiarly available to him.
Much of the uncertainty that has arisen in the cases is due to a failure
to recognize the source and character of the obligation which requires
the respondent to explain what happened to the missing assets. The
respondent's duty to make proof arises from a rule of law established
for the fair regulation of the judicial inquiry-not from the necessity of
meeting or counteracting the trustee's proof. It should be frankly
acknowledged that present possession of the property is presumed with89. This frequently cited quotation is from Blatch v. Archer, 1 Cowp. 63, 65, 93 Eng.
Reprints 969, 970 (K. B. 1774). The United States Supreme Court made reference to it
in Cooper v. Dasher, 290 U. S. 106, 109 (1933).
90. For the distinction between an inference of fact and a true presumption see 9
WIGmop, Evmsnce (3d ed. 1940) § 2491. The term "presumption of fact"' is often
used as a term equivalent to "inference." Wigmore states that "... 'a preumption of fact',
in the loose sense, is merely an improper term for the rational potency, or probative value,
of the evidentiary fact. . . .There is in truth but one kind of presumption; and the
term 'presumption of fact' should be discarded as useless and confusing."
the peculiar effect of a presumption 'of law' (that is,
Wigmore goes on to say "...
the real presumption) is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to reach
the conclusion in the absence of eVidence to the contrary from the opponent. If the
opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the judge's requirement
of some evidence), the presumption disappears as a rule of law, and the case is in the
,n T *.lxr-oz Evmmcz
jury's hands free from any rule." See TrAvym, Pz irRy
(1898) 313-352, especially 314-317; Morgan, Some Observations Concerring Prestmpions
(1931) 44 HsAv. L. Rzv. 906. Com. Molasses Corp. v. N. Y. Tank Barge Corp., 114 F.
(2d) 248 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
91. Ibid.
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out proof 2 and that this is done for the reason that the evidence to
prove or disprove present possession is so often beyond the reach of the
trustee while the respondent always holds it in the hollow of his hand.
It is because the so-called inference of present possession is considered
one of fact and as such is without logical foundation and hardly more
than a good guess that the courts strive to make the speculation as
accurate as possible by varying the strength of the inference with various
factors such as the character of the goods and the amount of elapsed
time between the taking and the turnover proceeding.
When the court draws the inference of present possession of property
from mere proof that it was taken, it cannot be unaware that it is dealing
with "speculative unrealities." ' Money goes fast but some persons manage to hold it much longer than others. There is a market for shoes but
some bankrupts may prefer to hide rather than sell them, at least until
the storm blows over. Books of account, unlike vegetables, do not perish
of themselves, but some bankrupts may put them in the fire before a
grand jury subpoena can be served. However, the guesswork will be
eliminated if we acknowledge that the trustee need not in the first instance prove present possession because the respondent, who knows the
facts, is under an obligation to tell the court whether he burned the books
or sold the shoes or spent the money.
The law, in like situations, has not hesitated to place the duty of
coming forward with the pertinent information and sometimes even
the strict burden of persuasion9 4 upon the person whose familiarity
with the facts makes him best able to produce it. Thus the bailee
of goods who fails to surrender them to the bailor upon demand has
the burden of showing facts to excuse his non-delivery thereof, and
so rebut a presumption of his negligence which arises upon his nonreturn of the goods. 95 If they were stolen or destroyed without his
92. "It is therefore a fallacy to attribute (as do some judges) an artificial probative
force to a presumption, increasing for the jury the weight of the facts, even when the
opponent has come forward with some evidence to the contrary." 9 WIoeMxORE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) § 2491. See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 90, at 903. "Presumptions . . .
are artificial rules which have a legal effect independent of any belief, and stand in the
place of proof until the contrary be shown." Smith v. Asbell, 2 Strobb. 141, 147. (S. C.)
93. A term used by Mr. justice Frankfurter in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 120
(1940).
94. Ready availability of proof has been recognized as a justification for placing even
the strict burden of proof upon the informed person. 9 WNhXoORE, EVIDENcE (3d ed.
1940) § 2486.

95. Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500, 28 N. E. 595 (1891); Galowitz v. Magner, 208
App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dep't 1924); Corbin v. Gentry Cleaning Co., 181
Mo. App. 151, 167 S. W. 1144 (1914); Hanes v. Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33
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fault, the bailee is in the best position to prove it; if the bailee is unable
to return the goods, he cannot defeat the bailor's suit by sitting back
and remaining silent while demanding that the bailor prove facts which
only the bailee knows. 6 The purpose of raising the presumption of liability is to assist the bailor in his predicament and to require that proof
come from the party to whom it may be exclusively available. The presumption is not a logical inference of fact flowing from the non-delivery
of the bailed goods, for it does not follow in reason that because the
bailee cannot produce the goods he has not done his duty in caring for
themY If the bailor may win his case by simply proving the bailment
and non-return of the goods, unless the bailee shoulder the burden of at
least adducing some proof to absolve himself from the presumption of
negligence, it would seem proper, by an equality of reasoning, to grant
a turnover order in favor of the trustee upon proof of the taking of the
goods plus a failure by the respondent to at least go forward with evidence tending to show his inability to surrender them at the time of the
turnover proceeding, 93
It may be argued that, in the turnover proceeding, no presumption of
continued possession should be raised and no duty of proof should be
(1915). These cases represent the majority view which places upon the bailee the burden
of proceeding with evidence to rebut the presumption of his liability. There is a vigorous
minority view which takes the position that, not merely the duty to proceed, but the
affirmative burden of proving facts in excuse, rests upon the bailee. Rustad v. Great
Northern R. Co., 122 Alinn. 453, 142 N. W. 727 (1913); Security Storage & T. Co. v.
Martin, 144 Md. 536, 125 At. 449 (1924). See BRovwN, Pmso.,L Pnorpr (1936) § 87.
96. "Since the bailor is generally at a disadvantage in obtaining accurate information
of the cause of the loss or damage, the law considers he makes out a cae for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur by proof of the bailment and the failure of the
bailee to deliver the property on proper demand." Corbin v. Gentry Cleaning Co., 181
Mlo. App. 151, 152, 167 S. W. 1144, 1145 (1914). "Considerations of fairness put upon
the warehouseman the burden of proving his own freedom from negligence. The good
are intrusted to him. He has charge and control of them. He determines the manner
of keeping them. He is in possession of such evidence as there is as to the circumstances
attending the loss. The bailor trusts the warebouseman and has no proof. It is not
unjust to the warehouseman to require him to sustain the burden of proving its (vic)
freedom from negligence." Rustad v. Great Northern R. Co., 122 Minn. 453, 454, 142
N. W. 727, 72S (1913). For other instances of a sirmil presumption see A
MomG:r op. cit.
supra note 90, at 926, 927.
97. BROwN, PEnsoNAL PRoPr arr (1936) § 87.
98. There are of course some differences between the two situations. The qitar.tu
of proof in the turnover proceeding-clear and convincing evidence-would have to be
adhered to. The fact that in the bailment there is a voluntary entruetment of the property
whereas in the turnover proceeding a fraudulent taking and concealment has been proved
should not justify any lesser requirements but should if anything call for the application
of more stringent rules against the respondent.
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cast on respondent, because defeat would be fraught with such serious
consequences to him. Of course, the apportionment of the duty of
making proof in the turnover proceeding must result from a judicious
balancing of the respective positions of trustee and respondent." The
trustee must not be unreasonably impeded in his administration of the
estate in bankruptcy nor should the respondent be subjected to unreasonable requirements. But the question of placing a duty of proof
upon respondent does not arise until the trustee has by clear and convincing evidence traced the property to respondent's possession. What
reasons can he then have for refusing to take up the story? He may be
unwilling to show how he disposed of the property because he would
first have to admit the taking and he may still have hopes of prevailing
on that issue due to the obstacles he has strewn in the trustee's path. 0 0
In other words, it may be considered bad "tactics" or "strategy" to
abandon the position taken on the first issue before that point is definitely lost, as where the referee may have reserved decision on the motion
to dismiss the trustee's case for failure to prove the taking. Such a viewpoint has little to recommend it for it regards the proceeding as a game
of wits rather than a judicial inquiry into the truth of the matter. The
respondent knows the truth and should be guided accordingly. Again
the respondent may be unwilling to tell what he knows because he fears
his testimony will tend to incriminate him. Or his refusal may be
nothing more than defiance. The respondent's predicament, however, is
always of his own making and deserving of little sympathy when balanced against the desirability of stating a rule which will result in increased dividends for creditors by making it less easy for the respondent
to flout the law.'
It is submitted that it is a wise rule of law, realistically facing the
practical aspects of a difficult situation, which raises a presumption of
continued possession and thus requires the respondent to assume the
burden of going forward with evidence to show his inability to comply
99. ". . . the conscience of judges in weighing the evidence under a clear perception
of the consequences . . . will restrain the courts from recklessness of bankrupt's rights
on the one hand and prevent the bankrupt from flouting the law on the other." Oriel v.
Russell 278 U. S. 358, 364 (1929).
100. This thought was probably in the court's mind in Danish v. Sofranski, 93 F. (2d)
424 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), where the court said that the respondent by denying the taking
had removed the issue of present possession from the case.
101. Compare the court's statement in Dittmar v. Michelson, 281 F. 116, 117 (C. C. A.
3d, 1922): "While, of course, a witness may properly decline to incriminate himself, yet
the fact that crime may make it more difficult and possibly hazardous to tell what became
of assets, does not destroy the presumption of the continued possession of assets, whose
disappearance is not accounted for."
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with the proposed order. When the trustee, in the face of severe difficulties, has succeeded in tracing missing assets to the possession of the
respondent who can assert no substantial adverse claim to them, then
the law should say that the trustee has done enough. From then on, it
is only fair to expect the respondent to take up the story and tell the
succeeding chapters. He surely knows, for he is the author.
In the past the courts have failed to take the presumption of continued
possession for what it really is and apply it in the light of its purpose.
Had they done so, much of the uncertainty that surrounded the "inference" of fact, would have been avoided. If, for valid reasons, there
arises a real presumption of continued possession, without any proof by
the trustee of that fact, the presumption is equally applicable whether
the property taken by respondent is money, diamonds, vegetables or
books of account, and no matter how long ago or how recently they
were taken. The practical results of employing the presumption rather
than the inference may be illustrated by a reconsideration of Danish v.
Sofranski.'02 There the money sought by the trustee had been taken
two years before the turnover order. The respondents were silent on
what had happened to the money. The court refused the order because
there was a fair doubt whether any of the money remained unspent and
even if there were some on hand it would be the "merest fancy" to fix
the amount. It is possible, however, that the respondents still had the
entire sum or some fraction thereof, and if that were the fact, the trustee
should have succeeded. He failed, however, because the inference of
fact upon which the court was forced to rest was unreliable. If a real
presumption of law had been indulged and the duty placed upon the
respondents to explain what happened to the money some certainty
might have resulted. If respondents refused to tell what they knew, the
turnover order would have been granted and the respondents would have
only their own defiance to thank for it, if compliance was impossible. If
the respondents in straightforward manner attempted to explain how
they spent the money over the two year period the court would have
been ready to credit their testimony. And here the observations of the
courts regarding their reluctance to grant turnover orders in the case of
money or saleable merchandise would have forceful application-not to
weaken the inference of continued possession-but to make the court
the more ready to credit the respondent's testimony that he sold the
goods and spent the money. But if the respondent by credible proof
could not account for the money that had been traced into his hands or
could explain how he disposed of only a portion of it, then the court,
102.

93 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
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with some degree of assurance, might have granted a turnover order
for the whole or a definite balance of the money. Thus, while it is
possible that in applying the presumption of law rather than the inference of fact in the Daish case, the same result might well have been
reached, it would be due not to guesswork or a sense of futility, but
because the facts were required to be made known by the man who knew
them best. And the trustee, and through him the creditors, would gain,
as gain they should, if the respondent's version of the facts disclosed the
whole or a balance of the money remaining in his possession.
The presumption of continued possession has the effect merely of
compelling respondent to go forward with evidence to show that he does
not have the property in question. It does not place upon him the
burden of persuasion on that issue. 10 3 The effect of raising the presumption therefore does not take from the trustee's shoulders the strict burden
of proof on all the issues. If the respondent performs his duty to go
forward, the effect of the presumption is removed and the trustee must
satisfy the court as a matter of fact that the respondent has the ability
to comply with the proposed order. 0 4
It may be urged with considerable force that even the strict burden
of proof, on the issue of present possession of the property sought by
the trustee should fall upon the respondent. °5 It is true that the
trustee has the affirmative of the issue but that consideration, while
helpful, is not the sole determinant of the incidence of the burden
of persuasion. 06 Rather a sound policy for the just and efficient regulation of the judicial inquiry should govern. 0 7 In certain situations
the burden of proof is placed upon the party who has peculiar knowledge
of the facts in issue.'0 For example, in the bailment cases discussed
above, there is a strong minority view which places upon the bailee the
103. Cf. Sheinman v. Chalmers, 33 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); In re Fisher, 32 F.
Supp. 69 (D. C. Md. 1940).
104. 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2491; TuAYxE, op. cit. supra note 90 at
336, 337. The respondent of course fulfills his obligation to go forward only when he
produces evidence such as the trier of the fact will believe. MoRoAX, op. cit. supra note 90
at 926, 927.
105. In Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358 (1929), though the Supreme Court spoke at some
length on the quantum of the proof required on the turnover proceeding, no statement
was made on the matter of the incidence of the burden of proof.
106. 9 WIGmORE, EVDmENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2486; MoRGAN, op. cit. supra note 90, at 911.
107. "The truth is that there is not and cannot be any one general solvent for all cases.

It is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations." 9 WiGoMRE, EvxDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2486.
the generally accepted reasons for creating presumptions correspond to a large
108. "...
degree with the considerations determining the allocation of the burden of persuasion."
Morgan, op. cit. supra note 90, at 929.
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strict burden of proving that the goods bailed were not lost or destroyed
through his negligence. °0 This is done for the same reason that the
majority rule requires the bailee to go forward with evidence to meet
the presumption of negligence-the fact that the bailee is in a far better
position to offer the proof.
In other phases of the bankruptcy proceeding, Congress, by affirmative provision in the Bankruptcy Act, has placed the burden of proof
upon the bankrupt where the facts are well known to the bankrupt
and relatively unavailable to creditors. In an involuntary proceeding,
where the petition alleges insolvency at the time of the commission of
an act of bankruptcy and this is denied by the alleged bankrupt, he
must lay bare all his books, papers and accounts and come into court
ready and willing to be examined. If he fail to do so, the burden of
proving solvency shall rest upon him. 10 This statutory provision is
founded upon a recognition of the relative positions of petitioning
creditor and alleged bankrupt. The latter knows vastly more about
his own financial condition than the creditor, and so it is made his duty
to make known the facts. Again, if less than three petitioners commence an involuntary proceeding and the alleged bankrupt in his answer
asserts the existence of twelve or more creditors, seeking thereby to
dismiss the proceeding, he must file a sworn list of all his creditors.
It is for the alleged bankrupt, who knows the facts, to speak, not for the
creditor who may be in the dark."' Again, where the bankrupt applies
for a discharge and objections are made, the Act provides
"That if, upon the hearing of an objection to a discharge, the objector shall
show to the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which... would
prevent his discharge in bankruptcy, then the burden of proving that he has
not committed any of such acts shall be upon the bankrupt.""1Congress has not hesitated to place upon the bankrupt the burden of
109. See note 95 supra.
110. Bankruptcy Act § 3d. See Hollister v. Oregon Hardwood Mfills, 15 F. (2d) 787
(C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
111. Bankruptcy Act § 59d.
112. Bankruptcy Act § 14b; see Federal Provision Co. v. Fmrhowrl:v. 94 F. (2d)
574, 575 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) where the court'spoke as follows: "The amendment of 1926
has revolutionized the procedure in discharge; the bankrupt may no longer remain inert,
standing upon the infirmities of the evidence against him; once a prima fade case appemrs,
the laboring oar passes to his hands and he must bring the boat to shore. It is he who
has caused the loss, who has access to the facts, and who alone knows what the explanation is; let him make it, let him satisfy the court that it really explains. Else be will
not be discharged!'
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absolving himself from the charge, when the objector has gone far
enough to establish "reasonable grounds" for believing it is true. And
this in the matter of obtaining a discharge, so important from the bankrupt's viewpoint. Thus Congress has thought it proper that, in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act, the burden should rest upon the
shoulders of the bankrupt in situations where he has not the affirmative
of the issue but where the necessary information is peculiarly available
to him. Accordingly it may be urged that the same principle should be
applied in the turnover proceeding and the respondent be required to
sustain the strict burden of proving his inability to comply with the
proposed order. However, the courts have never gone so far and perhaps with good reason. The nature of the proceeding, the quantum of
proof required and the punishment for contempt that is foreshadowed
in the event of a failure to obey are weighty matters which give pause
before the strict burden of proof is placed on the respondent. Be that
as it may, however, the fact that courts and legislatures have placed the
burden of proof upon the person who has peculiar knowledge of the
facts, strengthens our conclusion that, in the turnover proceeding, to
raise up a presumption of continued possession and thus require respondent to speak is good policy and good law.
It is believed, therefore, that the time is ripe for a reconsideration by
the courts of the so-called inference of continued possession of the
estate assets which respondent is shown to have taken. It should be
recognized that the inference considered as one of fact leads only to confusion and uncertainty while as a real presumption it serves a most
desirable function by requiring the respondent to contribute his information to the court's fund of knowledge so that a just decision may be
rendered. The looter will soon learn that defiance brings only defeat
and that it does not pay to flout the law.

